The level of government responsible for implementing policies affects intent, services provided, and ultimate outcomes. The decision about where to locate such responsibility is the federal design dilemma faced by Congress. Taking a new approach to this delegation and decentralization,The Federal Design Dilemma focuses on individual members of Congress. Not only are these legislators elected by constituents from their states, they also consider the outcomes that will result from state level versus national executive branch implementation of policies. Here, Pamela J. Clouser McCann documents congressional intergovernmental delegation between 1973 and 2010, and how individual legislators voted on decentralization and centralization choices. Clouser McCann traces the path of the Affordable Care Act from legislative proposals in each chamber to its final enactment, focusing on how legislators wrestled with their own intergovernmental context and the federal design of health insurance reform in the face of political challenges.
Chapter 1.A Puzzle of Intergovernmental Delegation
Chapter 2. A Theory of Federal Delegation Design
Chapter 3. Measuring the Federal Allocation of Authority
Chapter 4. Intergovernmental Context and Congressional Coalition Formation
Chapter 5. Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation from 1973-2010
Chapter 6. Intergovernmental Options and the Politics of Health Insurance Reform
Chapter 7. The Intergovernmental Context of Federal Policy Delegation Design
Federal energy is essential. But it is not enough. Only a total working partnership among Federal, Sate, and local governments can succeed. … With Federal assistance, State and local governments by 1970 will be spending close to $110 billion annually. These enormous sums must be used wisely, honestly, and effectively. We intend to work closely with the States and the localities to do exactly that.
Lyndon B. Johnson 1967
State of the Union Address
The Federal Design Dilemma 